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Abstract 
Trust in banks appears to be an essential element of well-functioning of macroeconomic 
systems, in general, and of financial markets, in particular. We study what factors 
determine the level of trust in banks before and after the 2007-08 financial crisis and how 
this crisis reshaped banking trust in 29 transitional countries. We find that younger, rural, 
educated, banked and generally trusting people tend to have higher confidence towards 
banks both in pre-crisis as well as post-crisis periods. Among country-level covariates, 
growth rate of GDP and Rule of Law remain positively and significantly associated with 
banking trust in both periods, while foreign bank participation starts to be detrimental to 
the trust after the crisis. In addition to ‘objective’ variables, we find that ‘subjective’ 
factors such as respondent’s personal experience with the crisis appear to strongly 
influence their trust in banks. Finally, after controlling for the “objective” variables, we 
find that the financial crisis has caused a decline in trust which is statistically significant 
but not dramatic or completely exceptional drop.  Our findings indicate that the financial 
crisis has temporary impact on peoples’ trust in banks since pulling back the rate of GDP 
growth tends to fully recover banking trust in transitional countries.     
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After Coleman (1988) and Putnam’s (1993) seminal papers, the trust has become 
increasingly popular in the economics literature and many arguments have been put 
forward as to why trust may improve economic performance. Economists start to point 
trust as a very important lubricant of a social system that has economic value and leads to 
high efficiency in society (Fukuyama, 1996). Increasing the number of mutually 
beneficial traders, addressing collective action problems, solving principal-agent 
problem, and improving information flows can be particularly emphasized as major 
channels through which trust fosters the development.  
Among many, economic benefits from higher cooperation that trust delivers, is regarded 
as a main channel of trust’s contribution to development (La Porta et al., 1997). As 
argued in the literature, higher trust associates with greater cooperation and the latter 
leads to better economic performance (La Porta et al., 1996, Fukuyama, 1996). 
Fukuyama (1996) suggests that cooperation through trust tends to be more effective 
substitute to cooperation through family ties. He stresses that large firms will prevail in 
high-trust societies in contrast to low-trust societies where smaller family firms are 
dominating.    
While generalized trust is important for overall economic performance, trust in banks 
appears to be even more crucial element particularly for well-functioning of financial 
systems. Guiso et al. (2009) argue that financial markets require particularly high level of 
trust mainly because people spend their money in exchange for financial promises. 
Decisions of people about using banking services are heavily influenced by trust in 
institutions that provide these services. Peoples’ trust levels in banks show in what extent 
they tend to cooperate with those institutions in order to produce more efficient outcomes 
and to avoid non-cooperative traps. More trusting individuals are more likely to buy 
stock, and conditional on buying stock, they will invest a larger share of their wealth in it. 
Higher trust in the financial markets can promote recovery and increase the perceived 
credibility of post-crisis reform.  As a more immediate threat, declining trust in financial 
markets can trigger financial panics and market crisis and therefore, must be regarded as 
very important element of recovery plan. Diamon and Dybvig’s (1983) canonical model 
shows that systematic banking crisis will be more likely in places where investor 
confidence is low. In addition, as argued by Guiso et al. (2004) the lack of trust amplifies 
the effect of costly participation in financial markets.   
Financial crisis may decrease people trust in financial institutions, lead some people to 
limit or stop cooperation with banks (i.e. withdraw deposits), and thereby exacerbate the 
impact of the crisis. Caprio (2005) stresses distrust in banks as one of the great and 
unmeasured costs of the crisis. Furthermore, financial crisis may lead to changes in 
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preference for political and economic systems and ultimately cause a decline in support 
for democracy and free markets (Grosjean et al., 2011). Financial crisis may even lead to 
drop in general trust levels of people and can be regarded as a cause of “trust crisis”. For 
example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that individuals who have recently suffered 
a trauma or a financial loss are generally less trusting. Giuliano and Spilimberge (2009) 
find that individuals who grew up during periods of macroeconomic volatility are more 
likely to support government redistribution and to believe that luck has more to do with 
success than effort.  
Despite the importance of peoples’ trust in determining the costs of financial crisis (i.e. 
2007-08 crisis), it remains largely unstudied.  A few empirical studies were conducted in 
the case of advanced countries which show a bit contradictory results when it comes to its 
short-term versus long-term consequences. For example, Graham and Narasimhan (2005) 
argue that corporate managers that have lived through the Great Depression in USA 
choose a more conservative capital structure with less leverage even after economic 
condition improves. A cross-country study conducted by Osili and Paulson (2009) 
stresses that experiencing a systematic banking crisis has important and long-term effects 
on individuals’ behavior in USA. They suggest that individuals who have experienced a 
systematic banking crisis in their countries of origin are less likely to use banking 
services in USA compared to otherwise similar individuals from the same country that 
have not lived through a crisis. Although Knell and Stix (2009) also find a detrimental 
impact of crisis on people’s confidence in Austrian banks, they fail to claim that this 
influence is long-lasting or permanent.    
As we see, there is a limited scope of empirical literature on the role of crisis in 
confidence towards banks, and our study seems to be the first to analyze trust in banks 
across transitional countries where the economies were among the hardest hit by the 
global financial crisis (Berglof and et al. 2009). According to European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2010), the GDP of transitional economies 
contracted by 5.2 percent and registered unemployment increased in 2009. Despite those 
great contractions, empirically, the evidence on the impact of the crisis on peoples’ trust 
in banks is also inconclusive.   
Combining responses from a survey of over 29,000 people in 29 transition economies 
both in 2006 and 2010, our study complements and extends the ongoing discussion on 
trust in banks in following three ways. First, it provides guidance into the origins of 
people confidence in banks in the context of transitional countries by studying its main 
determinants. Having a diverse sample of 29 former socialist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, allows us to robustly investigate the 
determinants of banking trust in transitional economies. Second, the study answers to 
question: ‘are these determinants different before and after global financial crisis?’. 
Finally, we study the role of 2007-2008 global financial crisis on the decline of trust in 
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banks across transitional countries. Here we also try to understand whether this drop 
constitutes a transitory phenomenon that will revert over time or this decline represents a 
permanent shift in the level of trust.   
Our findings indicate that younger, rural, university educated, banked and generally 
trusting people appear to have higher confidence towards banks both in pre-crisis as well 
as post-crisis periods. Among country-level variables, growth rate of GDP and Rule of 
Law remain positively and significantly associated with banking trust in both period, 
while foreign bank entry starts to be detrimental to the trust after the crisis. In addition to 
‘objective’ variables, we find that ‘subjective’ factors such as respondent’s personal 
experience with the crisis appear to strongly influence their trust in banks. We also find 
that financial crisis has temporary and small impact on peoples’ trust in banks across the 
households in transitional countries. For financial markets in transitional countries it may 
take shorter time to recover pre-crisis trust of people in banks. Simply, pulling back the 
overall rate of growth in economy will largely recover population’s trust in banks. This 
again shows that in contrast to advanced countries, post-crisis drop in trust of transitional 
economies does not represent a structural break involving a permanent decrease in it.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the data and 
methodology in the next section. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 
4 concludes the paper.  
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
2.1.Data source 
Our main source of data is the micro file of two rounds of the Life-in-Transition 
(henceforth, the LIT) survey which was implemented by the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development. First round of the data collection was in 2006, while 
the second one was in late 2010 (EBRD, 2007; EBRD, 2011). The timing of the LIT data 
collection is ideal to measuring the impact of the financial crisis on trust in banking 
institutions. The first round of the survey collected data on trust before the crisis started 
and the second one after the main wave of crisis had already hit transitional countries.  
Since the complete description of the LIT’s methodology, including a report on 
observations and a discussion of the experiences with data collection is disclosed 
elsewhere (EBRD, 2007; EBRD, 2011), we limit ourselves to a succinct discussion of the 
data set below.    
The main goal of conducting the LIT surveys was to collect directly comparable 
information about overtime changes in individuals’ and household’s experiences, 
behaviors, and attitudes across the set of the transitional economies. Each round of it is a 
cross-sectional survey which collected information on a broad range of topics, such as 
socio-demographic characteristics of respondents (e.g. age, gender, and educational 
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attainments) and households (e.g. dwelling ownership and rural/urban place of 
residency). Importantly, the LIT also collected the data about possession of a bank 
account, trust in banks, and social capital in form of trust in people. The data is collected 
through face-to-face interviews with trained interviewers.  
The most questions are the same across two rounds. However, round of 2010 also 
includes new module covering several question specifically design to gauge the effect the 
global crisis. The crisis impact module of LIT-2010 survey also provides insights into the 
various channels through which households were hit and the coping mechanisms that 
they adopted.    
The first round of LIT collected the information from 1,000 respondents in 28 transitional 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the Caucasus and the Central Asia (excluding 
Turkmenistan)
3
 and Turkey. The second round of the LIT conducted in 2010 collected 
the information from approximately 1,000 to 1,599 respondents in the same set of the 
transition countries (see Table A.1 in the appendix).  
In addition to two rounds of LIT surveys, we use country-level statistics on the macro, 
financial and institutional variables that might affect the degree of trust in banks. Our 
macro and banking indicators come from the EBRD country statistics, while measure of 
quality of institutions is from the World Bank governance indicators (World Bank 2006 
& 2010). Detailed discussion of outcome and explanatory variables can be seen below. 
 Outcome variable 
Our outcome variable is people’s Trust in Banks and is gauged in the LIT by asking 
respondents the question “To what extend you trust in banks and financial system?” The 
answers coded as Complete distrust =1, Some distrust = 2, Neither trust nor distrust = 3, 
Some trust = 4, Complete trust = 5.  
Some authors argued against using such a “subjective” measure of trust (Glaeser et al. 
2000; Akerlof and Shiller 2009) and proposed to employ more “objective” measures, for 
instance, possession of bank account or having higher usage of bank services (Osli and 
Paulson, 2009; Beck and Martin, 2011). However, using objective measures of trust can 
be even more problematic. The main problem with such objective measure is that it does 
not necessarily reflect the true confidence, since people choice can be either voluntary or 
involuntary. For example, an individual can have a checking account, but may not trust in 
banks (involuntary use of banking services). Alternatively, a person may not have an 
                                                          
3
 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, 
and Uzbekistan. 
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account (involuntary disuse of banking services), but may have a high confidence 
towards banks.  
In the light of above mentioned pros and cons, we employed a subjective measure of trust 
in banks.  
Explanatory variables 
The availability of individual and household-level data from the LIT allows us to control 
for factors that are likely to influence people trust in banks. Individual-level and 
household-specific variables like Age, Female, University, House Owner and Rural are 
selected since all these variables found to be important determinants of banking trust in 
previous studies (Osli and Paulson, 2009; Knell and Stix, 2009; Beck and Martin, 2011). 
Our Age variable shows the actual age of the respondent in years. Female is coded female 
=1, otherwise = 0. University is coded into a binary variable based on the highest level of 
academic qualification attained: bachelor level or higher = 1, otherwise = 0. The variable 
House Owner shows whether a household has its own dwelling or not and is coded 
yes=1, no=0. Rural is coded rural=1 if households residence is in rural area, otherwise=0.  
Individual’s experience and close collaboration with financial institutions can be seen as 
a source of their confidence towards those institutions (Malmendier and Nagel, 2009; 
Putnam, 2000).  Therefore, we added a variable reflecting an existence of people’s 
checking account in a commercial bank. Our Bank Account variable shows whether a 
household member has a bank account and is coded as yes=1, no=0. 
It is expected that being generally trustful person can increase the likelihood of trusting 
more in banks as well (Knell and Stix 2009). In this regard, we want to know the effect of 
social trust in confidence towards banks by using Trust in People variable which is coded 
as Complete distrust =1, Some distrust = 2, Neither trust nor distrust = 3, Some trust = 4, 
Complete trust = 5.  
In addition to LIT variables, we employ three country-level indicators that can largely 
influence the trust in banks. These variables are collected separately for two survey 
periods (LIT-2006 and LIT-2010) and include GDP growth, Rule of Law and Bank 
Foreign Ownership. GDP Growth shows average growth rate of real GDP before LIT-
2006 (2004-2005) and before LIT-2010 (2008-2009). Rule of Law reflects overall 
institutional development in transitional countries and measure average rule of law index 
of the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank for 2004-2005 and 2008-
2009 respectively. The index takes values from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher score reflecting 
better quality institutions. Bank Foreign Ownership shows the foreign ownership in 
banking system, which is also averaged for 2004-2005 and 2008-2009 respectively.  
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Finally, we use a set of subjective variables that are expected to be important 
determinants of trust (Rainer and Siedler, 2009; Knell and Stix, 2009). According to 
Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) and Roth and Erev (1995), information gained from 
personal experience has a greater effect on behavior relative to other sources on 
information. Therefore we use several relevant variables that reflect respondent’s and its 
household’s experience with the crisis. These variables include Crisis Effect, Closed 
Business, Lost Job, Lost Wage, Lost Foreign Income, and Lost Work Hours. All these 
variables are available in LIT-2010 micro file. Crisis Effect shows how much did the 
crisis affected the household and is coded as a great deal=1, a fair amount=2, just a 
little=3 and not at all=4. Closed Business reflects whether family business closed because 
of the crisis and is coded as yes=1, no=0. Lost Job shows whether any member of 
household lost a job and is coded as yes=1, no-0. Lost Wage reflects whether a 
respondent’s wage reduced or delayed and is coded as yes=1, no=0. Lost Foreign Income 
shows whether flow of remittances declined and/or family member returned from foreign 
country and is coded as yes=1, no=0. Finally, Lost Work Hours depicts whether the crisis 
decreased the working hours of respondent and is coded as yes=1, no=0.      
Overall, descriptive statistics for all explanatory variables are shown in Table A.2 in the 
appendix. 
2.2.Methodology 
The methodology of our study consists of several consecutive steps. First, we use 
descriptive methods to portrait and compare our outcome variable, trust in banks and 
financial system, across the years. Specifically, t-test is used to compare the level of trust 
before the crisis in 2006 and after the crisis in 2010. Although our outcome variable is 
ordered categorical by nature, in both years it appears to be normally distributed as 
graphically shown in Figure 1. Furthermore, the formal test of normality conducted for 
2006 round demonstrates that the trust in bank is normally distributed from the strict 
statistical point of view (Chi-squared = 5711; p = 0.000). Similarly, trust in bank is 
distributed normally in 2010 round (Chi-squared = 6152; p = 0.000). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Second, we analyze the determinants of trust in banks by estimating several OLS models 
for 2006 and 2010 rounds separately. In the first model and second models, we include 
individual and household-level variables only in order to avoid overloading the 
specification. In the third and fourth models, we add controls for country-specific 
covariates, namely, GDP growth, Rule of Law and Bank Foreign Ownership. In  
Third, we attempt to explain the role of the financial crisis in the drop of trust. We 
combine 2006 and 2010 rounds in a unified data set and estimate a regression model with 
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individual and household-level variables, country-specific covariates, along with crisis-
related subjective controls and time dummy for 2010.  
Fourth, we use Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to decompose the change in banking trust 
after the crisis. The decomposition allows us to estimate what share of the total variation 
in the difference of bank trust overtime can and cannot be explained by explanatory 
variables. 
Econometrically, in the second step, we estimate OLS model assuming that individual’s 
underlying response can be described by the following equation: 
                                                   
                                                    (1) 
where          denotes trust in banks by respondent   in country k,    
    is the vector of 
individual and households-level independent variables,         is the vector of country-
specific explanatory variables, and   is a disturbance parameter which is assumed to be 
normally distributed.  
In the third step, we run two set of regressions as follows: 
                                                   
                                           (2) 
and 
                                  
                                               (3) 
Where          represents the vector of subjective or perceptional variables, that actually 
show the degree and the ways of personal experience with the crisis. TimeDummy shows 
the period of the sample (pre-crisis and post-crisis period) and allows us to investigate the 
role of crisis in the drop of banking trust.  
Finally, in the fourth step, using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition algorithm, we 
investigate the effects of endowments and coefficients effects on the drop of banking 
trust (Jann, 2008). The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition equation can be written as 
follows: 
                                    
       
 
                   
                    (4) 
where        and       are expected value of banking trust before and after crisis 
respectively,       and      are vector of average endowments (socio-economic 
characteristics) before and after crisis respectively, and    and    are vector of parameters 
before and after crisis respectively. In the equation,           
     is the part that is 
explained by changes in the endowments or socio-economic characteristics, while the 
second two terms represent the unexplained part which come both from the changes in 
the coefficients (including differences in the intercept) and an interaction effect. This is 
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“threefold” decomposition and the explanation stems from Daymont and Andrisani’s 
(1984) following extension of the decomposition: 
          
                                         
                                                 
                                   
         
                                                                                            
The first line of the above decomposition equation (4) provides us with the overall 
characteristics effects. However, in our study we are also interested in detailed 
decomposition which can give us the detailed contributions of each single predictor. For 
example, we are particularly interested in evaluating the trust level gap due to differences 
in the crisis-related indicator such as real GDP growth. Therefore, we employ a detailed 
decomposition for the explanatory component of the equation (4), which is very easy to 
implement because the total component is a simple sum over the individual contributions 
(Jann, 2008). 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
3.1.Descriptive analysis  
 
First, we start to employ some descriptive analysis in order to understand in what extend 
the peoples’ trust levels in banks have been changed over the crisis period. A close look 
at the results of Panel A of Table 1 reveals that the trust in banks dropped after the crisis. 
For example, people who have at least some trust in banks accounted for 47 percent of 
respondents in 2006, while in 2010 only 40 percent of respondents reported that they 
have some or complete trust in banks. In contrast, people with some or complete distrust 
increased from 29 percent in 2006 to about 34 percent in 2010. Although the magnitudes 
of these changes are not that large, they are found to be statistically significant. The 
formal t-test demonstrates that distribution of trust in banks in 2010 is significantly 
different from that in 2006 (t=13.60; p=0.000).  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Using Panel B of Table 1, we can highlight some interesting properties of the level of 
trust across transitional countries and its change throughout the crisis. Panel B shows that 
trust in banks and its change over time differs widely across the countries. For example, 
respondents from Central Asian transitional countries generally report higher trust in 
banks compared to other economies. On average, more than half of the population of 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan show some or complete confidence in banks. In 
addition, in the whole sample the highest-trust country is found to be Estonia, where 
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almost 72 percent and 63 percent of respondents believe that banks can be trusted in 2006 
and in 2010 respectively. In contrast, countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria appear to be on the bottom of the list when it comes to trusting 
banks in both periods.   
 
Panel B of Table 1 also allows us to investigate which countries observed the highest as 
well as lowest drop in trust after the crisis. A close look at the results reveals that there is 
a contrast between the Eastern Europe and the rest of the transitional countries in terms of 
post-crisis decline in banking trust. Thus, the impact of the crisis seems to be much 
higher in Eastern Europe transitional countries compared to others. For example, the level 
of peoples’ some or complete trust in bank went down by 26, 24 and 23 percentage points 
in Romania, Hungary and Slovenia respectively. The impact of the financial crisis tends 
to be much higher in these countries mainly because of their financial integration to the 
world market, whereas countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are 
much less exposed to the international business cycle (EBRD, 2010). This can also 
confirm the fact that why average respondent from some CIS countries such as Russia, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia reports even higher confidence towards banks in 2010 compared 
to 2006. 
 
While these simple descriptive analyses show a clear difference between pre-crisis and 
post-crisis trust levels among the transitional countries, a question raises what then drives 
the trust in banks? To answer this question, we next turn to multivariate regression 
analysis.   
 
3.2.Econometrics Results 
Pre-crisis determinants of trust in banks 
In order to investigate the determinants of trust in banks, in Table 2 we employ OLS 
regression analysis before and after financial crisis periods separately. Looking first at the 
individual and household-level estimates of trust during normal times (Column 1), we 
find that older and female respondents have lower trust in banks. As expected, people 
with higher education appear to have higher confidence towards banks. Having a bank 
account, living in rural area, owning a private house and demonstrating higher social trust 
in people tend to have sizeable positive influence on respondent’s trust in banks. For 
example, having a checking account by at least one member of household increases the 
trust in banks by about 0.24 units, while one unit increase in trust in people leads to 0.21 
units increase in banking trust. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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In Column 2 of Table 2, we add country-specific variables and find all these controls 
statistically significant. Average growth of real GDP in past two years appears strongly 
and positively correlated with peoples’ trust in banks, statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. According to the model, Rule of law also tends to be a strong trust-building 
factor in transitional countries. We further found that foreign bank presence has small but 
statistically significant positive effect on trust in banks. Individual and household-level 
covariates remain statistically as well economically significant, except the positive 
coefficient for education which we fail to accept at 10 percent significance level.   
Post-crisis determinants of trust in banks 
Column 3 and Column 4 of Table 2 displays the OLS estimates for trust after the 
financial crisis. Column 3 shows that Individual and household-level covariates enter 
significantly except homeowners, which become statistically insignificant. The reported 
estimates suggest that younger, rural, banked and educated people have higher trust in 
banks after the crisis.  Having general trust in other people remains strongly correlated 
with respondents’ confidence towards banks. Nevertheless, after the crisis, being female 
starts to increase the trust in banks compared to opposite that was observed during the 
normal times. One can speculate about possible reasons behind this result but no 
explanation strikes us as particularly plausible.  
 
When we include country-specific variables in Column 4, the individual and household 
level covariates that we found to be significant in predicting peoples’ trust in bank 
continue to enter significantly. After controlling for individual and household-level 
covariates, economic growth and Rule of law also remain statistically significant with 
positive effect in trust. However, foreign ownership of banks starts to play detrimental 
role in peoples’ confidence. This can be explained by risen skepticism stemming from 
external finance that largely fueled a credit boom first and created the financial crisis later 
(Berglof et al., 2009).      
 
It can be observed that the magnitudes of coefficients for trust are different in pre-crisis 
and post-crisis periods. To check the robustness of these differences we use interaction 
approach as shown in Columns 5 of Table 2. By multiplying them with time dummy we 
aim to detect systematic changes in variables before and after the crisis.  Only two out of 
the ten interacted coefficients (interaction with education and Rule of Law) come out 
statistically non-significant. According to the results of Column 5, older and female 
people have increased their level of trust in banks vis-à-vis the average person during the 
crisis period. In contrast, people living in rural area, having bank accounts, owning a 
house and showing higher trust in others have decreased their confidence towards banks. 
Furthermore, country-level variables such as economic growth and foreign bank entry 
show lower trust levels after crisis.     
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Effect of crisis on trust in banks 
In order to understand the costs of financial crisis that associated with the drop in trust, 
we start to investigate how personal consequences of crisis affect their trust in banking 
system. Here we use subjective views of individuals who have lived through crisis and 
experienced crisis in different ways. For this purpose, we add perceptional data on crisis 
to our benchmark model and run the regression equation (2). The results of the 
estimations are shown in Column 1 of Table 3. 
  [Insert Table 3 about here] 
According to Column 1, the effect of personal experience with crisis on trust is both 
statistically significant and quantitatively large. For example, trust in bank is 0.20 unit 
points lower for people who consider the crisis to be a major threat to their life. 
Respondents reporting that they have been affected by crisis through wage lost, drop in 
remittances and decline in working hours tend to have lower trust in bank by 0.14, 0.06 
and 0.05 units respectively. Nevertheless, trust in banks appears to be indifferent to 
people who were affected by crisis through their job loss.  Interestingly, however, people 
who ended up closing the business because of the crisis are found to be positively 
associated with their trust in banks. The reason for this is that a very few people (3 
percent) report that their family business is closed due to the crisis which reduces the 
observations significantly.   
For an accurate interpretation of the crisis effect on the trust it is also important to look 
closer at the time-specific crisis dummy that we add to our benchmark model (equation 1) 
and remove the GDP growth variable as the crisis-related indictor. Our crisis-dummy 
measures the unexplained change in trust of people after the crisis period. According to 
the results of Column 2, crisis dummy is negative and statistically significant which 
means that unexplained average decline in trust after the crisis is 0.22 units.    
Model specified in Column 3 of Table 3 allows us to stress that unexplained drop in trust 
can be largely attributed to a deterioration of the general economic situation since crisis 
dummy becomes statistically non-significant just after controlling for GDP growth rate. 
In the next section, we conduct a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to ensure that our 
finding is robust.  
3.3.Decomposition Results 
We employ a detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to help find the contribution of 
each variable to the predicted trust level. Table 4 reports a summary of decomposition of 
the predicted trust level difference in banks (0.146) before and after the crisis period. As 
is apparent from the table, changes in the characteristics can explain a larger part (116%) 
of the changes in the level of trust in banks, while unexplained component explain a very 
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small part (16%) of the changes which also appears to be statistically insignificant. This 
means that in the post crisis period, the level of trust in banks would be very much similar 
or equal to pre-crisis period if there is no difference in characteristics (endowments) 
between two periods.   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
A closer look at the results of Table 4 reveals that the explained effect is almost 
exclusively driven by deterioration in the growth rate of GDP. The breakdown of the 
characteristics effects shows that drop in trust might recover as soon as a country starts to 
perform higher or pre-crisis GDP growth rate. More specifically, if the GDP growth after 
the crisis was same as pre-crisis period then the predicted gap in the level of trust would 
disappear. 
  
4. CONCLUSION 
Our findings indicate that younger, rural, university educated, banked and generally 
trusting people appear to have higher confidence towards banks both in pre-crisis as well 
as post-crisis periods. Among country-level covariates, growth rate of GDP and Rule of 
Law remain positively and significantly associated with banking trust in both period, 
while presence of foreign owned banks starts to be detrimental to the trust after the crisis. 
In addition to ‘objective’ variables, we find that personal experience with crisis plays also 
an essential role in the context of explaining the degree of trust in banks.  
 We also find that financial crisis has temporary and small impact on peoples’ trust in 
banks across the households in transitional countries. In the post crisis period, the level of 
trust in banks would be very much similar or equal to pre-crisis period if there is no 
difference in characteristics (endowments) between two periods. We also show that the 
decline in banking trust is largely a consequence of the macro economic downturn. 
Growth of national income has a strong impact on trust and in fact, it explains the major 
part of the crisis effect on trust, which poses a dilemma to commercial banks, as they 
cannot directly control macro economic growth. Nevertheless, high-dependence on 
general economic performance makes it possible for trust to return to its pre-crisis level 
quickly, otherwise would be very difficult and might lead to deeper stagnation in entire 
banking system.  
Finally, one main limitation of our study should be mentioned. In addition to soci-
economic characteristics of respondents and some socio-economic conditions at the 
country-level, trust in banks may also depend on the performance of financial institutions 
(Knell and Stix, 2009). It may increase or decrease with good or bad performance of 
banks. Due to the data shortage, we are not able to investigate whether drop in 
14 
 
performance and investments of financial institutions can have paralyzing effects on trust 
in those institutions.  
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Figure 1          
Test for normality of trust in banks       
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Table 1 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics – Whole Sample 
  Year 
Complete 
distrust  Some distrust 
Neither trust 
nor distrust Some trust Complete trust 
   N % N % N % N % N % 
Total 
2006 4,309 16.18 3,574 13.42 6,173 23.18 8,909 33.46 3,664 13.76 
2010 4,589 15.55 5,374 18.21 7,739 26.22 8,839 29.95 2,971 10.07 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics - Country average 
Albania 
2006 134 14.1 75 7.9 207 21.8 353 37.2 180 19.0 
2010 67 6.9 145 15.0 277 28.6 354 36.6 125 12.9 
Armenia 
2006 251 26.8 101 10.8 172 18.3 293 31.2 121 12.9 
2010 152 20.4 92 12.3 140 18.8 231 31.0 131 17.6 
Azerbaijan 
2006 99 12.1 113 13.9 186 22.8 218 26.7 199 24.4 
2010 128 13.4 124 13.0 170 17.8 420 44.0 112 11.7 
Belarus 
2006 94 10.5 109 12.2 218 24.3 297 33.1 178 19.9 
2010 57 6.7 146 17.2 219 25.8 271 32.0 155 18.3 
Bosnia 
2006 247 25.6 152 15.7 201 20.8 253 26.2 113 11.7 
2010 182 17.1 229 21.5 391 36.7 217 20.4 46 4.3 
Bulgaria 
2006 241 27.0 140 15.7 221 24.7 245 27.4 46 5.2 
2010 165 19.2 212 24.6 249 28.9 206 23.9 29 3.4 
Croatia 
2006 148 15.5 166 17.3 306 32.0 275 28.7 62 6.5 
2010 215 22.2 170 17.6 351 36.3 216 22.3 16 1.7 
Czech Republic 
2006 54 5.6 148 15.4 265 27.5 429 44.6 66 6.9 
2010 61 6.1 165 16.5 326 32.7 403 40.4 42 4.2 
Estonia 
2006 34 3.6 86 9.2 139 14.9 461 49.3 216 23.1 
2010 32 3.4 105 11.1 170 17.9 471 49.7 170 17.9 
Macedonia 
2006 363 38.8 104 11.1 223 23.8 179 19.1 67 7.2 
2010 174 16.8 149 14.4 329 31.8 249 24.1 132 12.8 
Georgia 
2006 97 11.3 117 13.7 192 22.5 338 39.5 111 13.0 
2010 32 4.0 107 13.3 202 25.0 430 53.3 36 4.5 
Hungary 
2006 119 12.7 164 17.4 286 30.4 296 31.5 75 8.0 
2010 336 33.4 252 25.1 267 26.6 113 11.2 37 3.7 
Kazakhstan 
2006 93 10.3 151 16.8 234 26.0 289 32.1 134 14.9 
2010 98 11.0 190 21.3 270 30.2 251 28.1 85 9.5 
Kyrgyzstan 
2006 134 14.7 88 9.6 110 12.0 400 43.8 181 19.8 
2010 133 14.6 150 16.4 138 15.1 260 28.5 232 25.4 
Latvia 
2006 52 5.5 118 12.5 239 25.4 444 47.1 89 9.4 
2010 160 17.6 205 22.6 223 24.6 281 31.0 38 4.2 
Lithuania 
2006 79 8.3 133 13.9 227 23.8 415 43.5 100 10.5 
2010 96 10.3 188 20.1 312 33.4 302 32.3 37 4.0 
Moldova 
2006 210 24.8 151 17.8 220 26.0 227 26.8 38 4.5 
2010 187 22.7 201 24.5 147 17.9 248 30.2 39 4.7 
Mongolia 
2006 89 10.1 71 8.1 161 18.4 323 36.8 233 26.6 
2010 47 5.2 96 10.7 189 21.1 423 47.2 141 15.7 
Montenegro 
2006 118 12.8 124 13.4 248 26.8 298 32.2 137 14.8 
2010 81 8.4 123 12.8 309 32.1 381 39.6 68 7.1 
Poland 
2006 110 11.9 147 15.9 260 28.2 337 36.6 68 7.4 
2010 98 6.3 319 20.6 488 31.4 579 37.3 68 4.4 
Romania 
2006 155 16.3 119 12.5 282 29.6 297 31.2 99 10.4 
2010 444 44.3 237 23.6 171 17.0 134 13.4 17 1.7 
Russia 
2006 234 25.9 195 21.5 210 23.2 208 23.0 58 6.4 
2010 319 22.6 265 18.8 349 24.7 349 24.7 129 9.1 
Serbia 2006 319 33.7 139 14.7 204 21.5 228 24.1 57 6.0 
20 
 
2010 370 24.9 294 19.8 473 31.9 299 20.1 49 3.3 
Slovakia 
2006 116 12.3 142 15.0 213 22.5 380 40.2 94 9.9 
2010 48 4.9 150 15.2 354 35.9 370 37.5 64 6.5 
Slovenia 
2006 42 4.4 93 9.7 282 29.3 423 44.0 121 12.6 
2010 112 11.5 220 22.7 309 31.8 277 28.5 53 5.5 
Tajikistan 
2006 42 4.8 62 7.1 139 15.9 264 30.2 368 42.1 
2010 33 3.8 115 13.2 188 21.5 268 30.7 269 30.8 
Turkey 
2006 273 31.5 114 13.1 169 19.5 126 14.5 186 21.4 
2010 202 21.1 161 16.8 240 25.1 252 26.4 101 10.6 
Ukraine 
2006 264 28.4 169 18.2 170 18.3 283 30.4 44 4.7 
2010 439 29.5 396 26.6 320 21.5 265 17.8 66 4.4 
Uzbekistan 
2006 98 10.6 83 9.0 189 20.5 330 35.8 223 24.2 
2010 121 9.6 168 13.3 168 13.3 319 25.3 484 38.4 
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Table 2           
Determinants of trust in 2006 and 2010         
           
 1 2 3 4 5 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Socio-economic characteristics  
Constant 2.7158*** 0.0328 2.5853*** 0.0345 2.3222*** 0.0477 2.6019*** 0.0384 2.3222*** 0.0468 
Age -0.0074*** 0.0004 -0.0063*** 0.0004 -0.0077*** 0.0005 -0.0042*** 0.0004 -0.0077*** 0.0005 
Female -0.0464*** 0.0156 0.0677*** 0.0147 -0.0312** 0.0160 0.0814*** 0.0150 -0.0312** 0.0157 
University degree 0.0446*** 0.0200 0.0572*** 0.0181 0.0278 0.0205 0.0650*** 0.0184 0.0278 0.0201 
Bank account 0.2388*** 0.0161 0.0837*** 0.0146 0.2562*** 0.0197 0.1838*** 0.0180 0.2562*** 0.0194 
Rural 0.1673*** 0.0161 0.0989*** 0.0149 0.1851*** 0.0165 0.0744*** 0.0152 0.1851*** 0.0162 
House owner 0.0832*** 0.0209 0.0119 0.0224 0.0835*** 0.0218 -0.0271 0.0233 0.0835*** 0.0214 
Trust people 0.2122*** 0.0063 0.1930*** 0.0068 0.2097*** 0.0064 0.1875*** 0.0069 0.2097*** 0.0063 
 
Country-level variables 
GDP growth       0.0496*** 0.0034 0.0353*** 0.0019 0.0496*** 0.0033 
Rule of Law       0.0354** 0.0150 0.0293* 0.0158 0.0354** 0.0147 
Bank foreign ownership        0.0010*** 0.0003 -0.0019*** 0.0003 0.0010*** 0.0003 
 
Interactions with dummy2010 
Dage             0.0035*** 0.0006 
Dfemale             0.1126*** 0.0219 
Duniversity degree             0.0372 0.0275 
Dbank account             -0.0723*** 0.0266 
Drural             -0.1107*** 0.0224 
Dhouse owner             -0.1106*** 0.0319 
Dtrust people             -0.0222** 0.0094 
Dgdp growth             -0.0143*** 0.0038 
Drule of law             -0.0061 0.0218 
Dbank foreign ownership               -0.0030*** 0.0004 
R2 0.0672 0.0394 0.0748 0.0595 0.0702 
Obs 25790 28107 24853 27116 51969 
  
Notes: The symbols ***, **, * mean that the coefficient is statistically different from zero, 
respectively, at the 1-,5-,10-percent level. 
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Table 3       
Effect of crisis on banking trust     
       
 1 2 3 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Socio-economic characteristics  
Constant 3.2728*** 0.0599 2.7776*** 0.0267 2.4851*** 0.0292 
Age -0.0051*** 0.0006 -0.0062*** 0.0003 -0.0059*** 0.0003 
Female 0.0919*** 0.0180 0.0162 0.0110 0.0327*** 0.0109 
University 0.0267 0.0223 0.0421*** 0.0137 0.0482*** 0.0137 
Bank account 0.1702*** 0.0213 0.2076*** 0.0133 0.2093*** 0.0132 
Rural 0.0440** 0.0184 0.1264*** 0.0112 0.1204*** 0.0111 
House owner -0.0630** 0.0271 0.0543*** 0.0160 0.0337** 0.0159 
Trust people 0.1791*** 0.0084 0.2027*** 0.0047 0.2011*** 0.0047 
 
Country-level variables 
GDP growth 0.0230*** 0.0023   0.0379*** 0.0016 
Rule of Law 0.0274 0.0196 -0.0418*** 0.0103 0.0359*** 0.0107 
Bank foreign ownership -0.0008** 0.0003 -0.0015*** 0.0002 -0.0006*** 0.0002 
 
Subjective variables 
Crisis effect -0.2053*** 0.0121     
Closed business 0.0878** 0.0423     
Lost job 0.0026 0.0205     
Lost wage -0.1415*** 0.0188     
Lost foreign income -0.0561*** 0.0218     
Lost working hours -0.0511** 0.0222     
 
Dummy2010     -0.2162*** 0.0112 0.0228 0.0148 
R2 0.0681 0.0562 0.0669 
Obs 18386 51969 51969 
 
Notes: The symbols ***, **, * mean that the coefficient is statistically different from zero, 
respectively, at the 1-,5-,10-percent level. 
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Table 4 
    
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of difference in trust in banks of 0.146 points between 2006 
and 2010 
    
  Coef. Std. Err. 
Share 
(%) 
Aggregate effect (explained) 0.1674*** 0.0107 115.8 
Aggregate effect (unexplained) -0.0228 0.0148 -15.8 
    
Detailed Effects of Explained Component    
Age -0.0049*** 0.0008 -3.4 
Female -0.0153*** 0.0028 -10.6 
University degree -0.0007*** 0.0003 -0.5 
Bank account -0.0099*** 0.0012 -6.8 
Rural 0.001*** 0.0004 0.7 
House owner 0.0011 0.001 0.8 
Trust people -0.0569*** 0.0028 -39.3 
GDP growth 0.2343*** 0.0126 162.1 
Rule of Law -0.0022* 0.0012 -1.5 
Bank foreign ownership 0.0121*** 0.0018 8.3 
 
Notes: 1. The symbols ***, **, * mean that the coefficient is statistically different from zero, 
respectively, at the 1-,5-,10-percent level. 
2. Share is ratio of the contribution of each factor or group of factors to the predicted overall 
differences in banking trust before and after the crisis.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1 
Country sample size of LIT-2006 and LIT-2010 surveys 
 
  2006 2010 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Albania 1000 3.45 1055 3.27 
Armenia 1000 3.45 1000 3.1 
Azerbaijan 1000 3.45 1002 3.11 
Belarus 1000 3.45 1000 3.1 
Bosnia 1000 3.45 1087 3.37 
Bulgaria 1000 3.45 1014 3.14 
Croatia 1000 3.45 1006 3.12 
Czech Republic 1000 3.45 1007 3.12 
Estonia 1000 3.45 1002 3.11 
Macedonia 1000 3.45 1072 3.32 
Georgia 1000 3.45 1000 3.1 
Hungary 1000 3.45 1054 3.27 
Kazakhstan 1000 3.45 1000 3.1 
Kyrgyzstan 1000 3.45 1016 3.15 
Latvia 1000 3.45 1007 3.12 
Lithuania 1000 3.45 1013 3.14 
Moldova 1000 3.45 1043 3.23 
Mongolia 1000 3.45 1000 3.1 
Montenegro 1000 3.45 1013 3.14 
Poland 1000 3.45 1616 5.01 
Romania 1000 3.45 1078 3.34 
Russia 1000 3.45 1584 4.91 
Serbia 1000 3.45 1519 4.71 
Slovakia 1000 3.45 1011 3.13 
Slovenia 1000 3.45 1000 3.1 
Tajikistan 1000 3.45 1007 3.12 
Turkey 1000 3.45 1004 3.11 
Ukraine 1000 3.45 1559 4.83 
Uzbekistan 1000 3.45 1500 4.65 
Total 29000 100 32269 100 
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Table A.2       
Descriptive statistics for independent variables     
       
Variable  Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Socio-economic characteristics  
Age 
2006 29000 46.5155 17.7218 17.000 97.000 
2010 32269 45.4760 17.4179 17.000 99.000 
Female 
2006 29000 0.4150 0.4927 0.000 1.000 
2010 32269 0.6118 0.4873 0.000 1.000 
University 
2006 29000 0.1888 0.3913 0.000 1.000 
2010 32269 0.1979 0.3984 0.000 1.000 
Bank account 
2006 28980 0.3633 0.4810 0.000 1.000 
2010 32269 0.4122 0.4925 0.000 1.000 
Rural 
2006 29000 0.4268 0.4946 0.000 1.000 
2010 32269 0.4123 0.4923 0.000 1.000 
House owner 
2006 29000 0.8332 0.3728 0.000 1.000 
2010 32269 0.8781 0.3272 0.000 1.000 
Trust people 
2006 27970 2.6366 1.2331 1.000 5.000 
2010 30613 2.9288 1.0617 1.000 5.000 
 
Country-level variables 
GDP growth 
2004-2005 29000 6.9481 2.6773 3.7000 15.2000 
2008-2009 32269 0.3568 4.7659 -11.1000 10.1000 
Rule of Law 
2004-2005 29000 -0.2313 0.6924 -1.4448 0.9263 
2008-2009 32269 -0.1697 0.7140 -1.3153 1.1105 
Bank foreign ownership 
2005 28000 52.6862 33.5820 4.4000 99.4000 
2009 31262 59.2081 32.0485 4.4000 98.3000 
 
Subjective variables 
Crisis effect 
2006 NA NA NA NA NA 
2010 30232 2.4032 1.0887 1.0000 4.0000 
Closed business 
2006 NA NA NA NA NA 
2010 32269 0.0300 0.1707 0.0000 1.0000 
Lost job 
2006 NA NA NA NA NA 
2010 21691 0.2925 0.4549 0.0000 1.0000 
Lost wage 
2006 NA NA NA NA NA 
2010 21691 0.5235 0.4995 0.0000 1.0000 
Lost foreign income 
2006 NA NA NA NA NA 
2010 21691 0.2230 0.4163 0.0000 1.0000 
Lost work hours 
2006 NA NA NA NA NA 
2010 21691 0.1974 0.3980 0.0000 1.0000 
 
